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Dear Ms. D'Alesandro:
Re:

State v. Kalmar
Case No. 970747-CA

Pursuant to Rule 24(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Appellee Linda Kalmar cites the following supplemental
authorities in support of her argument that strict compliance is
required in order to incorporate a plea affidavit where the
concern is whether the defendant was properly "advised of the
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea" as
required by Rule 11(e) (7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1995) (trial
court must engage in plea colloquy to ensure that
requirements of Rule 11(e) are met)
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987)
("Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of
ensuring that ... rule 11(e) requirements" are met; cannot
assume that defense attorney made sure defendant understood
contents of the affidavit)

Ms. Julia D'Alesandro
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State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988)
("may not rely on defense counsel or executed affidavits to
satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 11(e)")
Judges Bench, Greenwood and Garff heard argument on this
case on October 29, 1998. I would appreciate it if you would
distribute this letter of supplemental authority to those judges
at your earliest convenience.
Sincerely,

Joan C. Watt
Attorney for Appellee
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

V.

:

LINDA A. KALMAR,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 970747-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over the state's appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .

The state has

the ability to appeal an order allowing withdrawal of a guilty
plea pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (g) (Supp. 1997) .
A copy of the "Order Allowing Defendant to Withdraw No contest
Plea in Abeyance" which the state is appealing is in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Whether the trial judge had the power to withdraw
Appellee's plea of no contest prior to sentencing but more than
thirty days after the plea hearing, where such plea was held in
abeyance and Appellee was not informed of the thirty-day
limitation for withdrawing pleas.
Standard of Review.

This issue involves a question of

law which should be reviewed for correctness.

See State v.

Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah App. 1997) (statutory
interpretation and jurisdictional issues present questions of law
which are reviewed for correctness).
Preservation.

The state argued in the trial court that a

request to withdraw a no contest plea must be made within thirty

days of the plea proceeding.

R. 63.

TEXT OF RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l (1995) provides:
77-2a-l. Definitions.
For purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by
the court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of
no contest from the defendant, but not, at that
time, entering judgment of conviction against him
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that
he comply with specific conditions as set forth
in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an
agreement entered into between the prosecution
and the defendant setting forth the specific
terms and conditions upon which, following
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea
may be held in abeyance.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2

(1995) provides in pertinent

part:
77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement-Negotiation--Contents--Terms of agreement--Waiver
of time for Sentencing.
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea
of guilty or no contest but prior to entry of
judgment of conviction and imposition of
sentence, the court may, upon motion of both the
prosecuting attorney and the defendant, hold the
plea in abeyance and not enter judgment of
conviction against the defendant nor impose
sentence upon the defendant within the time
periods contained in Rule 22 (a) , Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3

(Supp. 1997) provides in

pertinent part:
77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea--Powers of court.
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation
of a plea in abeyance agreement shall be done in
full compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may
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provide that the court may, upon finding that the
defendant has successfully completed the terms of
the agreement:
(a) reduce the degree of the offense
and enter judgment of conviction and impose
sentence for a lower degree of offense; or
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's
plea and order the dismissal of the case.
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has
successfully completed the terms of a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court shall reduce the
degree of the offense, dismiss the case only as
provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as
agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a
defendant for any lesser offense pursuant to a
plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not
invoke Section 76-3-402 to further reduce the
degree of offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6

(1995) provides:

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn
at any time prior to conviction.
(2)
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and
with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest is made by motion and
shall be made within 3 0 days after the entry
of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the
rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an
infraction, a defendant shall be represented by
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in
open court. The defendant shall not be required
to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable
time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty,
guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty
or not guilty by reason of insanity.
If a
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant
corporation fails to appear, the court shall
enter a plea of not guilty.

3

(c) A defendant may plead no contest only
with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not
guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be
given a preference for an early trial. In cases
other than felonies the court shall advise the
defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for
making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill,
and may not accept the plea until the court has
found:
(1) if the defendant is not
represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and
does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right
to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by
entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4)
(A) the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon
trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all
those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for
the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the
charged crime was actually committed by
the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit
culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result

4

of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has
been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of
the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised
that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on
questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these
factors after the court has established that
the defendant has read, understood, and
acknowledged the contents of the affidavit.
If the defendant cannot understand the
English language, it will be sufficient that
the affidavit has been read or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute
or rule, a court is not required to inquire
into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside,
but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)
(1) If it appears that the prosecuting
attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a
plea to a lesser included offense, or the
dismissal of other charges, the agreement
shall be approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed
by the court, the court shall advise the defendant
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is
not binding on the court.
(h)
(1) The judge shall not participate in plea
discussions prior to any plea agreement being made
by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement
has been reached, the judge, upon request of
the parties, may permit the disclosure of
the tentative agreement and the reasons for
it, in advance of the time for tender of the
plea. The judge may then indicate to the
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel
whether the proposed disposition will be
approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that
final disposition should not be in
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conformity with the plea agreement, the
judge shall advise the defendant and then
call upon the defendant to either affirm or
withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of
the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea
of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest,
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea,
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of
guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a
hearing within a reasonable time to determine if
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of
sentence, the court upon its own initiative may,
or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest
judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for
the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of
the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has
attached, order a commitment until the defendant
is charged anew or retried, or may enter any
other order as may be just and proper under the
circumstances.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information dated September 1, 1995, the state
charged Defendant/Appellee LINDA A. KALMAR ("Appellee" or
"Kalmar") with theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995).

R. 5-6.

Appellee was booked and

released to Pretrial Services on May 5, 1997.

R. 2.

On September 15, 1997, Appellee appeared before the
Honorable David S. Young, Third District Court, Salt Lake County
and pleaded no contest to attempted theft, a class A misdemeanor.
6

R. 52.

That no contest plea was made pursuant to a plea in

abeyance agreement between Appellee and the state.
26-27.

R. 46-50,

A copy of the plea in abeyance agreement is in

Addendum B; a copy of the Statement of Defendant ("Affidavit") is
in Addendum C; a copy of the transcript of the September 15, 1997
hearing is in Addendum D.
On November 6, 1997, prior to sentencing and following
off the record discussions between the parties and the judge, the
trial judge allowed Appellee to withdraw her plea in abeyance.
R. 60-66.

The transcript of the November 6, 1997 hearing is in

Addendum E.
On November 24, 1997, the trial judge signed the "Order
Allowing Defendant to Withdraw No contest Plea in Abeyance"; that
order was filed on December 1, 1997. R. 31.

See Addendum A.

The state filed its Notice of Appeal on December 5, 1997. R. 33.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Appellee was employed by Cook's Books.

R. 54-55, 61.

She did not receive a salary; instead, she received a commission
based on a percentage of book sales that she made.

R. 55.

In August 1994, Kalmar submitted her resignation.

R. 55.

At that time, Kalmar had outstanding commissions for which she
was still receiving money.

R. 55.

People who had purchased books from Kalmar sent checks
1

Because the case did not go to trial, evidence was not
introduced.
The fact statements in Appellee's and Appellant's
briefs are based on statements in the Information, the plea
affidavit and the plea in abeyance agreement as well as statements
made during the plea and restitution hearings.
7

directly to her.

R. 55.

Believing that Kalmar had the money

coming to her for commissions, Kalmar and/or her sister deposited
three checks from clients directly into Kalmar's account.
The three checks totaled $1,530.28.

R. 55.

R. 26.

It is not clear from the record whether Kalmar was due
$1,530.28 in outstanding commissions or whether the amount was
actually more or less than that.

At the restitution hearing

during which the judge withdrew Kalmar's plea, the judge
indicated that during off the record discussions, he had been
told that the company sent some correspondence which "indicated
that in fact the net obligation after they offset the commissions
they owed her and the money that she owed them, and so on, was
something like $687... ."

R. 61.

That correspondence is not in

the record and the judge did not take evidence as to Kalmar's
position in regard to any possible restitution.2
2

Additionally,

The state incorrectly claims in its brief that "[a]t the
restitution hearing, defendant represented to the court that after
offsetting the monies owed her by her former employer, she owed the
company $687.00 in restitution (R. 61)."
State's brief at 5
(footnote omitted). The record actually shows that the trial judge
indicated that in an off the record discussion, he had been shown
correspondence in which Cook's Books claimed $687 in restitution.
Defense counsel stated that the trial judge's recitation of the off
the record discussion and the judge's statement that the amount
claimed by Cook's Books in the letter "was something like $687
dollars" was "pretty close."
R. 61; see Addendum E containing
R. 61-62. The record does not support the state's claim in its
fact statement that it was Kalmar's position that she owed $687 in
restitution.
Indeed,
Kalmar's
position
throughout
these
proceedings has been that she did not owe any restitution.
See
R. 47-49, 54-55, 61-62 in Addenda D and E. Moreover, Kalmar did
not make any statement admitting or even suggesting that she owed
Cook's Books any restitution.
See State v. Galli, Case Nos.
960018, 960122, 960123, slip op. at 12 (Utah 1998)(statement by
attorney in restitution hearing does not constitute admission by
defendant).
8

the judge recognized that there was "the difficulty of
determining restitution."

R. 60-61.

The judge did not make a

finding as to the amount of restitution, if any, Kalmar owed
Cook's Books.
On September 15, 1997, Kalmar pleaded no contest to a
class A misdemeanor attempted theft, with that plea to be held in
abeyance on the terms contained in the plea in abeyance
agreement.

R. 52, 26-27.

Pursuant to the plea in abeyance

agreement, if the trial judge found after a restitution hearing
that Cook's Books owed Kalmar $1,530.28 or more, Kalmar could
withdraw her plea in abeyance and the case would be dismissed six
months after the plea hearing.

R. 26-2 7; see Addendum B.

If the

judge found that the commissions due Kalmar were less than
$1,530.28 and that Kalmar therefore owed restitution, Kalmar
could withdraw her plea in abeyance and have the case dismissed
after she paid such restitution.

R. 27.

At the plea proceeding, the trial judge was initially
concerned with whether a restitution hearing ought to be held
prior to his acceptance of a plea from Kalmar.

R. 47-49.

Thereafter, the trial judge conducted "an abbreviated colloquy."
R. 55.3

Although there was a plea affidavit, the judge did not

3

The trial judge, who is experienced and thorough, and who
has conducted numerous plea colloquys during his years on the
bench, appears to have intentionally not followed the dictates of
Rule 11, perhaps due to his concern as to whether this matter was
criminal in nature. Prior to the colloquy, the trial judge asked
the prosecutor, "[i]f you went through the evidence and found out
that, indeed, [Cook's Books] owed her money, you wouldn't want to
prosecute her?" The prosecutor responded, "Right," and went on to
say that if it turned out that Kalmar did not owe money, the state
9

ask Kalmar whether she had read, understood and acknowledged the
affidavit.

R. 46-56; see "Statement of Defendant" ("Affidavit")

in Addendum C.

Instead, the colloquy was limited to asking

whether Kalmar (1) understood that the no contest plea would be
treated as an admission of guilt if the judge later had to review
the matter, (2) understood that she was waiving her right to a
trial, the requirement that the state call witnesses, and her
right to silence, (3) was satisfied with the advice of defense
counsel, and (4) was under the influence of any drug, alcohol,
narcotic, or anything which would impair her judgment.

R. 50-51.

The judge did not discuss the elements of the crime, the facts as
they related to those elements or the thirty-day limit for
withdrawing pleas, among other things.
After Kalmar pleaded no contest and the court scheduled a
restitution hearing, defense counsel asked the court, "[s]hall we
execute this?"

R. 54.

The judge then directed Kalmar to sign

the Affidavit.

R. 54.

No other discussion regarding the plea

Affidavit occurred.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge asked defense
counsel whether he "wanted to say something more about the facts
and elements."

R. 54.

Defense counsel responded:

Defense counsel:

The issue is, she put in her

would "essentially dismiss the case," but that he didn't think that
was "the way it's going to come down."
R. 49. The judge then
asked whether the state had any objections to holding the
evidentiary hearing prior to taking the plea. R. 49. Although the
plea was ultimately taken, this exchange evidences concern by the
judge prior to the plea colloquy as to whether this case involved
a criminal matter.
10

resignation for her employment, and at the time
she put in her resignation she still had some
money coming on commissions. She didn't receive
a salary; she got a percentage of all book
sales. She made sixteen percent. And the
resignation--the letter of resignation was in
August of '94, and so terminated her employment
at that time.
R. 54-55.
elements."

This is the only discussion regarding the "facts and
R. 54.

A few days before the November 6, 1997 hearing, the
parties and judge had an off the record discussion during which
they apparently agreed to withdraw the plea and set the matter
for trial.

R. 60.

At the November 6, 1997 hearing, the judge

made a record of that discussion, indicating that there was
difficulty determining restitution and that the matter appeared
to be an accounting dispute which should be settled in civil
court.

R. 62.

The state argued that the time for withdrawing

the plea had passed.

R. 63.

The trial court stated that there

was "good cause for allowing the plea to be withdrawn," denied
the state's objection and allowed the plea to be withdrawn.
R. 64.

On December 1, 1997, the trial court entered the "Order

Allowing Defendant to Withdraw No contest Plea in Abeyance" which
stated,
Pursuant to the defendant's motion, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that her plea in abeyance to a
Class A Theft that was entered on September 15,
1997 is withdrawn. After reviewing the material
and discussing the matter with Ernie Jones,
Deputy District Attorney and defendant's
attorney, Lynn R. Brown, the Court on the motion
of the defendant terminates the plea in abeyance
and declines to enter judgment against her.
R. 31.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial judge correctly concluded that he had the
authority to allow withdrawal of Kalmar's plea in abeyance.
Three distinct bases for this authority exist.
First, the thirty-day limitation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-13-6(2) (b) (1995) is not triggered unless the defendant is
informed of the thirty-day limitation on withdrawing pleas during
the plea proceedings.

Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

appears to require that the trial judge explicitly inform the
defendant of this limitation during the colloquy.

The trial

judge did not mention the thirty-day limitation during the plea
colloquy in this case.
Even if a statement in the plea affidavit would suffice
to inform the defendant of the thirty-day limitation, the plea
affidavit must be properly incorporated in order to rely on the
affidavit as the basis for establishing that the defendant was
informed of the thirty-day rule.

In this case, the Affidavit was

not incorporated into the record since (1) the trial judge did
not ascertain that Kalmar had read, understood and acknowledged
the Affidavit, and (2) the trial judge did not clarify
ambiguities created by the Affidavit and the plea in abeyance
agreement which allowed Kalmar to later withdraw her plea without
any time limitations.

Because the Affidavit was not incorporated

and the judge did not mention the thirty-day limitation during
the colloquy, the jurisdictional nature of the thirty-day
limitation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) was not triggered in this
12

case.
Second, Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
a trial judge to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea at any time
prior to imposition of sentence.

That rule explicitly states

that a trial judge may arrest judgment "[a]t any time prior to
the imposition of sentence ... if the facts ... admitted do not
constitute a public offense ... or there is other good cause for
the arrest of judgment."

In this case, the trial judge properly

arrested judgment based on his determination that the matter was
civil in nature and did not constitute a crime.

In addition, the

trial judge properly arrested judgment based on the noncompliance
with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking the
plea.
Third, a plea in abeyance is not "entered" until after
the conclusion of the plea in abeyance agreement and only if the
defendant does not meet the conditions of the plea in abeyance
agreement.

The plea in abeyance agreement in this case

contemplated that Kalmar's no contest plea was not "entered" at
the plea proceeding so as to trigger the thirty-day rule of
section 77-13-6(2)(b) since the plea in abeyance agreement
contemplated that Kalmar would withdraw her plea in abeyance more
than thirty days after the plea proceeding.

Because the plea in

abeyance was not entered, the thirty-day limitation of section
77-13-6(2)(b) did not deprive the judge of jurisdiction.

13

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE HAD JURISDICTION TO
WITHDRAW APPELLEE'S NO CONTEST PLEA IN ABEYANCE.
The state has not challenged the substance of the trial
judge's ruling that the plea should be withdrawn.4

The only

issue raised by the state and therefore the only issue which is
properly before this Court is the question of whether the trial
judge had jurisdiction to withdraw the plea of no contest which
had been held in abeyance.
The trial judge had jurisdiction to withdraw the plea
since (1) Appellee was not informed of the thirty-day limitation
where the judge did not refer to that limitation during the plea
colloquy and did not incorporate the plea Affidavit into the
colloquy; hence, the thirty-day limitation was not triggered in
this case; (2) a trial judge can properly arrest judgment at any
time prior to imposition of sentence pursuant to Rule 23, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (3) a plea in abeyance is not
subject to the thirty-day limitation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-136(2)(b) (1995).
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE HAD JURISDICTION TO WITHDRAW
THE PLEA SINCE APPELLEE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE
THIRTY-DAY LIMITATION.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) states in part:

4

As set forth infra at 25-30, the trial judge had good cause
to withdraw the plea since there was not strict compliance with
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking the plea, and
a factual basis for the plea did not exist due to the lack of
criminal intent. The trial judge's determination that this matter
involved a civil accounting dispute rather than a crime established
good cause for withdrawing the plea.
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(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest is made by motion and shall be made
within 3 0 days after the entry of the plea.
Although this Court held in State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578
(Utah App. 1992) that the thirty-day limitation in section 77-136(2)(b) is jurisdictional and runs from the date of the plea
proceeding, the "jurisdictional nature" of the statute is not
triggered unless the defendant is informed of the thirty-day
limitation at the time the plea is taken.
582.

See Price, 837 P.2d at

This Court reached its decision that the jurisdictional

limit does not apply unless the defendant is informed of the
thirty-day limitation by construing section 77-13-6(2)(b) "in
conjunction with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure."

Price, 837 P.2d at 582.

Rule 11(5) (g) states: "The court may refuse to
accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and may
not accept the plea until the court has found ...
the defendant has been advised of the time limits
for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest." Rule 11(6) provides:
"Failure to advise the defendant of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty or no contest is not a ground for
setting the plea aside, but may be ground for
extending the time to make a motion under Section
77-13-6." Therefore, although the language of
Section 77-13-6(2) (b) is unconditional, it is
subject to an exception incorporated within
Rule 11.
Price, 837 P.2d at 582.
Requiring that the defendant be informed of the thirtyday rule in order to trigger the jurisdictional nature of section
77-13-6(2)(b) squares with this Court's prior decisions regarding
15

application of that section.

See Price, 837 P.2d at 583

(discussing State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991), cert.
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) and State v. Ouintana, 826 P.2d
1068 (Utah App. 1991)) .

This Court explained in Price that the

defendants in Smith and Quintana were not informed of the thirtyday limitation since they pleaded guilty before section 77-13-6
was amended to include that limitation.

The determination in

those cases that the thirty-day limitation did not deprive the
trial judge of jurisdiction was therefore correct.
Rule 11 and case law governing the validity of guilty
pleas provide guidance in determining whether Kalmar was
"informed" of the thirty-day limitation, thereby triggering the
jurisdictional nature of that provision.
Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Utah 1991).

See, e.g., State v.
Rule 11(e) lists the

findings to be made by a trial judge prior to accepting a guilty
plea.

It provides that "[tjhese findings may be based on

questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, an
affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the affidavit."

Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure (emphasis added).
Utah case law requires strict compliance with Rule 11 in
the taking of guilty pleas, and allows reliance on information in
the plea affidavits only where the affidavit is properly
incorporated "when the trial judge ascertains in the plea
colloquy that the defendant has read, has understood, and
16

acknowledges all the information contained [in the affidavit]."
Macruire, 830 P.2d at 217; see also Smith, 812 P.2d at 477.

In

Smith, quoted favorably in Macruire, this Court looked to the
affidavit in determining whether there was strict compliance with
Rule 11 only because "the trial court carefully reviewed
appellant's plea affidavit with appellant during the plea
colloquy, and then incorporated the affidavit into the record of
the plea hearing."

Smith, 812 P.2d at 476.

This Court

emphasized:
It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11
compliance be demonstrated on the record at the
time the guilty or no contest plea is entered,
rstate v.1 Gibbons, 740 P.2d [1309 (Utah 1987)]
at 1313 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 470, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1172, 22 L.Ed.2d
418 (1969)). Therefore, if an affidavit is used
to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed
during the plea hearing. Jd. at 1314. The trial
court must conduct an inquiry to establish that
the defendant understands the affidavit and
voluntarily signed it. The inquiry cannot stop
there, however. ... Any omissions or ambiguities
in the affidavit must be clarified during the
plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in
the course of the plea colloquy. Then the
affidavit itself, signed by the required parties,
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313, can be incorporated
into the record.
Smith, 812 P.2d at 477.

Hence, in order to consider an affidavit

when determining whether a defendant was informed of the thirtyday limitation, the trial judge must address the affidavit during
the colloquy and inquire whether the defendant understands and
voluntarily signed the affidavit.
Additionally, Rule 11(f) indicates that "[f]ailure to
advise the defendant of the time limits" (emphasis added) for
17

moving to withdraw a plea may be grounds for extending the time
for filing such a motion.

Use of the word "advise" suggests that

even if the thirty-day rule is outlined in a properly
incorporated affidavit, the trial judge must advise the defendant
of the limitation during the colloquy.
In the present case, the trial judge did not inform
Kalmar during the colloquy that she must move to withdraw her
plea of no contest within thirty days or lose the opportunity to
do so.

Pursuant to subsection (f) of Rule 11, the lack of such

information during the colloquy provided a basis for extending
the thirty days, and defeated the jurisdictional nature of the
statute.
In addition, even if such information in the Affidavit
would suffice to "advise" the defendant of the limitation, the
jurisdictional nature of the thirty-day limitation was triggered
only if the trial judge ascertained that Kalmar had read,
understood and acknowledged the Affidavit.

See Smith, 812 P.2d

at 477; Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217; Price, 837 P.2d at 582;
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Although paragraph 14 refers to the thirty-day rule, the
trial judge did not ascertain that Kalmar had read, understood
and acknowledged the Affidavit, and the Affidavit therefore was
not incorporated into the plea colloquy.

The only reference to

the Affidavit during the colloquy was when the judge told Kalmar
to sign the Affidavit after defense counsel inquired whether they
should execute it.

R. 54.

This direction from the judge that
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Kalmar sign the Affidavit is not sufficient under Maguire and
Smith to establish that Kalmar read, understood and assented to
the contents of the Affidavit.
Nor does the recitation in the Certificate of Attorney
which is attached to the Affidavit meet the Rule 11(e) and case
law requirement that the trial judge ascertain during the
colloquy that the defendant has read, understood and acknowledges
the contents of the affidavit.

See Smith, 812 P.2d at 477.

Counsel's discussions with a defendant and belief that the
defendant understands is not a substitute for the requirement
that during the plea hearing, the trial judge "must conduct an
inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the affidavit
and voluntarily signed it."

See id.; see also Maguire, 83 0 P.2d

at 217 (citing Smith, 812 P.2d at 470).

In this case where the

trial judge did not conduct such an inquiry, strict compliance
with Rule 11 is not demonstrated.
Moreover, the Affidavit was not incorporated since
ambiguities as to the application of the thirty-day limitation in
this case were not clarified during the colloquy.

Although the

Affidavit indicated that the plea could be withdrawn only if a
motion were filed within thirty days "after the entry of [the]
plea," the plea in abeyance agreement anticipated withdrawal of
the plea after the restitution hearing, which was scheduled for
more than thirty days after the plea proceedings.

In other

words, although the Affidavit stated that a plea must be
withdrawn within thirty days of entry of the plea, the plea in
19

abeyance agreement contemplated withdrawing the plea more than
thirty days after the plea proceedings.

The term "entry of plea"

was not defined for Kalmar and she could have reasonably
understood that "entry of the plea" would not occur until after
the conclusion of the plea in abeyance agreement.

It is not

clear when the Affidavit is considered in conjunction with the
plea in abeyance agreement, whether the thirty days began to run
at the time of the plea proceeding or only after unsuccessful
conclusion of the plea in abeyance agreement.5
Smith instructs that "[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in
the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing" in order
to incorporate the affidavit.

Smith, 812 P.2d at 477.

Hence,

the Affidavit was not properly incorporated for two reasons:

(1)

the judge did not ascertain that Kalmar had read, understood and
acknowledged the Affidavit, and (2) the judge did not clarify the
ambiguities created by the inconsistency between the plea
Affidavit and the plea in abeyance agreement.
The jurisdictional nature of section 77-13-6(2) (b) was
not triggered in this case where the trial judge did not (1)
advise Kalmar of the thirty-day limitation during the colloquy,
(2) incorporate the Affidavit into the hearing and (3) clarify
ambiguities in the Affidavit which were created by the plea in
abeyance agreement.

Since the jurisdictional nature of the

thirty-day limitation was not triggered, the trial judge had the
5

Conviction would be entered in this case only if Kalmar
unsuccessfully completed the plea in abeyance agreement; see
discussion infra at 31-32.
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authority to withdraw the plea.6
B. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY ARRESTED JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 23, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
At any time prior to imposition of sentence, the
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion
of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a
public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill,
or there is other good cause for the arrest of
j udgment. ...
(emphasis added).

The plain language of this rule allows a trial

judge to arrest judgment where a defendant has pled guilty at any
time prior to imposition of sentence.

While facts are "proved"

at a trial, they are "admitted" when a defendant pleads guilty or
no contest.

The inclusion of the words "or admitted" clarifies

that a judge has the ability to arrest judgment after a defendant
has pled guilty or no contest and prior to sentencing where good
cause exists for such arrest of judgment.7
6

In order for the state to establish that the trial judge
lacked jurisdiction under Section 77-13-6(2) (b) , it must establish
that the defendant was informed of the limitation.
Although
Appellee did not explicitly argue that the jurisdictional nature of
the statute was not triggered, that argument was implicit in the
proceedings below.
Moreover, this Court can affirm on any
reasonable legal grounds which are apparent in the record.
See
State v. Montova, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997) (appellate
court can affirm on grounds which are "apparent on the record").
7

Although the parties did not refer to Rule 23, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure during argument, the order being appealed
reads as if it were an order arresting judgment. The judge based
his ruling on his refusal to sentence or enter judgment against
Kalmar because he did not believe a crime had been committed.
Moreover, this Court can properly affirm the order on this legal
basis regardless of whether it was raised below since the record
supports such affirmance. See Montoya, 937 P. 2d at 149 (citing
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah
21

Allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any
time prior to sentencing harmonizes with the other statutes and
rules that control criminal proceedings.
initiated by the filing of an Information.

A criminal case is
Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-2-2 (1995) . After the criminal matter is commenced by the
filing of an Information, the district court has jurisdiction
over the matter until entry of a final order dismissing the case
or final judgment of conviction.8

In order to sentence a

1969)) (appellate court will affirm judgment on any proper legal
ground which is apparent on the record).
8

Pursuant to statute and rules, district court judges have
limited authority to act in criminal cases following judgment of
conviction. For example, a notice of appeal is filed in the trial
court within thirty days after judgment. Rule 4, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. A trial judge has the power to enter an order
extending the time for filing a notice of appeal for up to thirty
days after the notice is originally due.
Id.
Additionally, a
trial judge can entertain a motion for new trial if that motion is
filed within ten days after judgment.
Rule 24, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
In Price, this Court assumed that "entry of the plea"
occurred
during
the
plea
proceeding,
without
considering
alternative meanings for that term. See Price, 837 P. 2d at 582-83.
The term "entry of the plea" is ambiguous, however, in that it
could refer to the time at which the defendant "enters a plea" by
stating "no contest" or "guilty" on the record, or it could refer
to the later time at which the trial judge enters the plea in the
court record as a judgment of conviction.
Construing the term to mean the time at which the trial
judge enters the plea as a judgment of conviction would harmonize
with other rules and statutes. A defendant would have thirty days
after entry of judgment to either file a notice of appeal or motion
to withdraw. Trial judges with jurisdiction over a criminal case
would not be deprived of the authority to withdraw a plea, while
maintaining the power to oversee all other matters relevant to the
case.
Support for construing section § 77-13-6(2)(b) to allow
thirty days to withdraw a plea following entry of judgment of
conviction is found in the legislative history of the statute.
Senator Carling, who sponsored the senate bill, informed the
legislators that the bill was designed to prevent defendants from
returning to court four or five years down the road and asking to
22

defendant, a trial judge must be convinced that there is a legal
basis for doing so.

Indeed, at sentencing proceedings, trial

judges almost universally inquire as to whether there is a legal
reason not to sentence a defendant.

A legal reason not to

sentence a defendant certainly includes the existence of an
illegal plea.
In addition, sentencing often occurs more than thirty
days after a plea is entered.

The trial judge's power to arrest

judgment ensures that prosecutors follow through on sentencing
recommendations and other provisions of plea agreements.

Since

withdraw pleas after evidence had been lost.
The senator
indicated, "this bill has been presented which would indicate that
a person may withdraw their guilty plea only within 3 0 days after
they entered that plea and there has been a final disposition. . . . "
See Addendum F containing comments by Senator Carling to the Utah
State Senate. The legislative history does not suggest the intent
to limit the authority of a trial judge to withdraw pleas where the
judge otherwise has jurisdiction over a criminal case and has not
yet sentenced the defendant.
While there is support for the Price interpretation that
the thirty days begin to run at the plea proceeding, the efficient
administration of a criminal case requires that a trial judge who
finds good cause for withdrawing a plea prior to sentencing have
the authority to do so. Moreover, this Court reached its decision
in Price by comparing motions to withdraw guilty pleas with filing
provisions for notices of appeal and petitions for writ of
certiorari.
Such filings are distinct from motions to withdraw
pleas since they create jurisdiction which does not otherwise
exist. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure creates appellate
jurisdiction only if the notice is timely filed; likewise, Rule 47,
Utah
Rules
of Appellate
Procedure
allows
for
certiorari
jurisdiction only if the petition is timely filed. By contrast,
the Price interpretation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) takes away power
to withdraw pleas in cases where a trial judge otherwise has
jurisdiction over the case.
This Court need not reconsider its conclusion in Price that
the thirty days begin to run at the plea proceeding, however, since
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides an alternative
grant of authority to a trial judge to arrest judgment prior to
imposition of sentence.
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failure to comply with a plea agreement can be grounds for
withdrawal of the plea (see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971); State v. Gladnev, 951 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1998)), it
follows that a trial judge has the power to allow a defendant to
withdraw a plea at any time prior to sentencing in order to
provide a procedure for withdrawal to defendants where sentencing
is scheduled more than thirty days after the plea proceeding.9
Rule 23 provides this power to the trial judge.
Moreover, where there is basis for withdrawing a plea, a
defendant can proceed under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(3) .

Since a defendant

can withdraw an illegal plea at any time under Rule 65B, the
efficient administration of justice requires that a trial judge
who has jurisdiction over a case and who finds good cause to
withdraw the plea be able to do so prior to sentencing.

An

unnecessary waste of resources would occur if defendants who
enter involuntary or otherwise illegal pleas and decide to
withdraw such pleas prior to sentencing were not allowed to do so
pursuant to Rule 23.

The plain language of Rule 23, along with

the trial judge's continued jurisdiction over the criminal case,
give the judge the authority to allow withdrawal of a plea at any
time prior to sentencing where good cause for such withdrawal
exists.

The efficient administration of justice along with

Rule 23 require that a trial judge have the power to withdraw a
9

In most felony cases, sentencing occurs more than thirty
days after the plea proceeding in order to allow Adult Probation
and Parole time to prepare a presentence report.
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bad plea prior to sentencing even if more than thirty days has
passed from the plea hearing.
Good cause existed in this case to arrest judgment since
the judge did not comply with Rule 11 in accepting the plea and
the facts did not indicate that a crime had been committed.
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in part:
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill,
and may not accept the plea until the court has
found:
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right
to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by
entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4)
(A) the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon
trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all
those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for
the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the
charged crime was actually committed by
the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit
culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result
25

of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has
been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of
the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised
that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on
questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these
factors after the court has established that
the defendant has read, understood, and
acknowledged the contents of the affidavit.

Where the trial judge does not strictly comply with
Rule 11, withdrawal of the plea is the appropriate remedy.
Smith, 812 P.2d at 476.

See

As set forth supra at 16-18, strict

compliance with Rule 11 must be demonstrated on the record by
either questioning of the defendant during the colloquy or by
proper incorporation of an affidavit at the colloquy.

See

Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Smith, 812 P.2d at
476-77.

An affidavit is properly incorporated only "when the

trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant
has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information
contained

[in the affidavit]."

Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure; Macruire, 830 P. 2d at 217.
In this case, the trial judge did not strictly comply
with Rule 11 at the plea hearing.

First, the judge did not make

any findings as required by the rule; nor did he state that he
accepted Kalmar's plea.

R. 51-53.

Specifically, the judge did

not find that the plea was voluntary, that Kalmar knew her
constitutional rights and waived those rights, that she
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understood the elements and that the state would be required to
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a
factual basis for the plea, that Kalmar had been advised of the
thirty-day limit for withdrawal of a plea, or that Kalmar had
been advised that her right to appeal was limited.

Failure to

make these findings constitutes noncompliance with Rule 11,
demonstrating good cause for arrest of judgment.

See Smith, 812

P.2d at 476.
In addition to not making the required findings, during
the colloquy, the court did not inform Kalmar of several of the
items required by Rule 11.

The trial judge did not fully inform

Kalmar of the rights she was waiving.

Instead, he told Kalmar

that she was waiving her "rights to trial" and outlined only some
of those rights.

R. 51.

Trial judge: If I accept your plea to no contest
on this case, you're waiving all of your rights
to trial. That means from this point on, there
would be no trial. The state would not be
!
obligated to call witnesses to testify against
you, you would waive your rights of silence, and
acknowledge at least what happened here, so that
we could get to the evidentiary hearing. Do you
understand that?
R. 51.

The trial judge did not specify that Kalmar enjoyed a

presumption of innocence, that the state would otherwise be
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed
the crime, that she had the right to have a jury decide whether
she was guilty, that she had a right to confront and crossexamine witnesses or that she had the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses.
27

See Rule 11(e) (3) .

During the colloquy, the trial judge also did not discuss
the nature or elements of the offense.

While he informed Kalmar

that she would be pleading to attempted theft, a class A
misdemeanor and the potential sentence for that offense, the
trial judge did not outline the elements that the state would
have to prove to convict her of that charge.

R. 52.

Nor does the transcript of the plea proceeding
demonstrate a factual basis for the plea.

The prosecutor's

initial statement does not cover the factual basis for the plea.
See R. 47-8.

After Kalmar pleaded no contest, defense counsel

stated:
Defense counsel: The issue is, she put in her
resignation for employment, and at the time she
put in her resignation she still had some money
coming on her commissions. She didn't receive a
salary; she got a percentage on all book sales.
She made sixteen percent. And the resignation-the letter of resignation was in August of '94,
and so terminated her employment at that time.
And after she terminated her employment,
checks came to her directly from the people that
she sold the books to. So she endorsed the
checks and deposited them in her bank account.
Actually, I think her sister did on two of
them. But she felt that she had money coming,
and that was the issue.
R. 54-5.

This passage coupled with the remainder of the colloquy

fails to establish that Kalmar actually committed the crime of
attempted theft or that the state had "sufficient evidence to
establish substantial risk of conviction."

Rule 11(e) (4) (B) .

Indeed, nothing suggests criminal intent on Kalmar's part, a
necessary element of the crime.

Hence, the colloquy does not

demonstrate that "there is a factual basis for the plea."
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Rule 11(e)(4)(B).
The colloquy also does not outline all of the details of
the plea in abeyance agreement nor include questioning by the
judge to ascertain that Kalmar understood and agreed to the terms
of the agreement.

Hence, there was not strict compliance with

subsection (6) of Rule 11(e).
Finally, the colloquy does not indicate that the trial
judge advised Kalmar during the hearing of the time limits for
filing a motion to withdraw plea or that her right to appeal
would be limited by the plea.

The colloquy therefore fails to

demonstrate strict compliance with the requirements of
subsections 7 and 8 of Rule 11.
Since the trial judge did not ascertain during the
colloquy that Kalmar had read and understood the Affidavit and
acknowledged all of the information in the Affidavit, the
Affidavit was not incorporated into the record.

See Maguire, 83 0

P.2d at 217; Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Because the Affidavit was not incorporated, strict compliance
with Rule 11 must be demonstrated during the colloquy.

In this

case where the colloquy does not demonstrate strict compliance
with Rule 11 requirements, the trial judge had good cause to
arrest j udgment.
Additionally, even if the Affidavit were considered, the
Affidavit fails to demonstrate a factual basis for the plea, as
that term is defined in Rule 11(e)(4)(B).

Pursuant to Rule

11(e)(4)(B), "[a] factual basis is sufficient if it establishes
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that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of conviction."
Under the elements section of the Affidavit, the
following handwritten paragraph appears:
On 8-10-94 [through] 9-7-94 the defendant, a
party to the offense attempted to exercise
unauthorized control over the property of Cooks
Books with the purpose to deprive the owner and
the value exceeded 1,000 but less than $5,00 0.
R. 19.

In the section of the Affidavit where the factual basis

for the plea is to be included, the handwritten phrase "same as
elements" appears.

R. 19.

These portions of the Affidavit coupled with the plea
colloquy fail to demonstrate that Kalmar committed the crime of
attempted theft or that there was sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk that she would be convicted of that
crime.

Indeed, the Affidavit adds nothing regarding the factual

basis of the plea, and the limited recitation of the facts during
the colloquy suggests that Kalmar lacked the required "purpose to
deprive" and that her control over the money might not have been
unauthorized.
In this case where the plea was not accepted in strict
compliance with Rule 11, a factual basis for the plea did not
exist, and there was no showing of criminal intent, the trial
judge had good cause to arrest judgment.
C. A PLEA IN ABEYANCE IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
THIRTY-DAY LIMITATION OF SECTION 77-13-6(2) (b) .
30

A plea in abeyance contemplates that any such plea which
is accepted by a trial judge will not be entered as a conviction
unless and until the plea in abeyance agreement is violated.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-l through 4 outline the requirements for
pleas in abeyance.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l provides in part:

(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a
court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or
no contest from the defendant but not, at that
time, entering judgment of conviction against him
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that
he comply with specific conditions set forth in a
plea in abeyance agreement.
This section clarifies that a trial judge "accepts" a plea in
abeyance but does not enter judgment of conviction nor impose
sentence for such pleas.

Hence, a plea in abeyance is not

"entered" at the plea hearing.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(l) further clarifies that while
a judge "accepts" a plea in abeyance, he treats that plea
differently than a regular guilty or no contest plea since he
holds the plea in abeyance and does not enter it as a judgment of
conviction.

The plea in abeyance statutes contemplate that in

many cases, a plea will be withdrawn after the defendant
successfully completes the agreement, and the charge dismissed.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3 (Supp. 1997).

In most cases, this

withdrawal of the plea will occur more than thirty days after the
plea hearing.

Hence, while pleas in abeyance are "accepted,"

they are not "entered" as are regular pleas.

The requirement of

section 77-13-6(2)(b) that a defendant make a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea within thirty days of entry therefore does not
31

apply to pleas in abeyance.10
In this case, the trial judge never explicitly stated
that he accepted Kalmar's plea.

Additionally, he did not comply

with the Rule 11(e) requirements nor make the findings which are
required prior to acceptance of a guilty plea.

While the plea

may not even have been "accepted" by the trial judge, its status
as a plea in abeyance further defeats the application of section
77-13-6(2) (b) since a plea in abeyance, by its very nature, is
not "entered" until after the conclusion of the plea in abeyance
agreement.X1

The plea in abeyance agreement contemplated that

the plea would be withdrawn months after the plea proceeding.
Hence, the plea in abeyance agreement reflected the statutory
expectation that pleas in abeyance are "entered," if at all,
after the conclusion of the plea in abeyance agreement.

Since

Kalmar's no contest plea in abeyance was not "entered," the
thirty-day limitation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) had not begun to
run and the trial judge had the power to withdraw the plea in
abeyance.

10

If the thirty-day limitation of section 77-13-6(2) (b) began
to run at the plea proceeding for pleas in abeyance, commonly used
plea in abeyance agreements could not be utilized. Ordinarily, a
plea in abeyance agreement runs for a set period of time greater
than thirty days, during which the defendant is required to meet
certain conditions.
11

This is a proper grounds for affirmance regardless of
whether it was raised below. See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149. The
trial judge, believing he had jurisdiction to withdraw the plea,
simply ordered that the plea be withdrawn without exploring the
statutory bases for his power.
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CONCLUSION
The trial judge correctly concluded that he had the
authority to withdraw Kalmar's no contest plea in abeyance.
authority was based on three distinct grounds:

That

(1) the thirty-

day limitation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) was not triggered since
Kalmar was not informed of that limitation; (2) Rule 23, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a judge to arrest judgment at
any time prior to imposition of sentence regardless of the
thirty-day limitation in section 77-13-6(2)(b); and (3) the plea
in abeyance was not "entered" and therefore the thirty-day
limitation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) had not begun to run.
Accordingly, Appellee Linda Kalmar respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the trial judge's order allowing her to
withdraw her no contest plea in abeyance.

SUBMITTED this

L±

day of

c jL

^

1998
7i

•

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 450 S. State, 5th Floor, P. 0. Box 140230, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 E. 300 South,
6th Floor, P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854,
this

/xt*

day of

Q ^ L

1998.

C-ahM
'AN C. WATT

DELIVERED copies to the Utah Court of Appeals and the
Utah Attorney General's Office as indicated above this
of

:^/^0*7^<'1998.
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ADDENDUM A

LYNN R. BROWN, #0460
Attomey for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

DE

^0.1 W7

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ALLOWING
DEFENDANT TO
WITHDRAW NO CONTEST
PLEA IN ABEYANCE

v.
LINDA KALMAR,
Defendant.

Case no.

971900756FS

JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG

Pursuant to the defendants motion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that her plea in
abeyance to a Class A Theft that was entered on September 15, 1997 is withdrawn. After
reviewing the material and discussing the matter with Ernie Jones, Deputy District Attomey
and defendants attomey, Lynn R. Brown, the Court on the motion of the defendant
terminates the plea in abeyance and declines to enter judgement against her.
DATED this _ ^ ^ = r ^ a r o r N o v e m b e r , 1997.

HONORABL
Third Distri

3i

ADDENDUM B

Toiro «i-u c,a; Oisirici

S c ? 1 ^ 1SS7
AGREEMENT FOR PLEA IN ABEYANCE

/"
/ / ( J A L f UAJ\5 COUNTY

ov/)

( n r '/ASt^

^

•-.-

In accordance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code §77
2a-2,3 SC 4. Linda Kalmar, by and through her attorney, Lynn R. Brown and the State by
and through its attorney Ernie Jones and with the approval of this Court, enter into the
following agreement for a plea in abeyance:
1•

The defendant will enter a no contest plea to Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor.

2.

At the time Linda Kalmar enters a no contest plea, the attorney for the State,

Ernie Jones and the attorney for Linda Kalmar, Lynn R. Brown will move the Court to hold
the plea in abeyance and not enter a judgment of conviction nor impose sentence pending
the completion of this agreement. Linda Kalmar waives her right to have sentence imposed
within the time periods contained in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3.

It is understood by the parties, that the issue to be resolved by this agreement

and plea in abeyance is whether or not Linda Kalmar owes any restitution to her former
employer, Cooks Books, for having deposited three checks into her personal checking account
in the total amount of $1,530.28.
4.

To resolve the question of restitution, it is agreed that the Court may set a

restitution hearing date and allow the parties at that time to present evidence to support their
claims.
5.

If the Court determines at a restitution hearing that Linda Kalmar has money

owing to her by Cooks Books in the amount of $1,530.28 or more then it is agreed that
Mrs. Kalmar will pay no restitution to Cooks Books and the plea in abeyance may be
withdrawn and the case dismissed by the Court, after at least 6 months has expired from the

i\a

date of the entry of the plea.
6.

If the Court determines at the restitution hearing that Linda Kalmar owes any

amount to Cooks Books, then Mrs. Kalmar will be ordered to pay the determined amount
within a specified time frame to be agreed upon by the parties. After completing the
payment of restitution as ordered by the Court, the plea in abeyance may be withdrawn and
the case dismissed.
7.

If at anytimeduring the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, Linda Kalmar

violated any conditions, the Court may order her appearance to show cause why the
agreement should not be terminated. If it is determined after an evidentiary hearing that
Mrs. Kalmar has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of this agreement,
the Court may terminate the agreement and enter judgement and conviction and impose
sentence against her for the offense to which the original plea was entered.
This agreement entered into this

(h

day of September, 1997.

LINDA KALMAR, Defendant
pfrr*^-— K- f£t><5U~~

LfiQN R. BROWN, Attorney for Defendant
The terms and conditions as
provided in this agreement,
are approved by the Court

HONORABLE

ADDENDUM C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH

Third iuclcial 0istrict

St? 1 5 1397
STATEMENT OF DEFEN ©AM^CSl

THE STATE OF UTAH,

"&,juLy Cleric

Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER

v.
Case No.

FS

Defendant.

COMES NOW, /t/vs-dg

£ihpta'Y'

, the defendant in this case

and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of (guiltVMQocontesjMo the following crime(s):

CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT

'•la&iA

B.

C.

I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it,
and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading
(guijtyl (no contest)

The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows:

My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable,
that

constitutes

I

am

the

entering

elements

this/these

of

the

plea(s)

crime(s)

voluntarily

charged

and

with

are

as

follows:

knowledge

and

understanding of the following facts:
1 . 1 know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I
recognize that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount,
as determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me.
r: I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right
to counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following
reasons:

2

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and

understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other
proceedings and the consequences of my plea of guilty.
4.
L\^

L

If

I

have

not

waived

my

right

to

counsel,

my

attorney

is

/ a r | d I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement,

my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney.
5. I know that i have a right to a trial by jury.
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense
to testify in court upon by behalf.
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to
do so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial
is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted
by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal by conviction and
sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court
and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be

3

paid by the state.
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to
which I plead j^Jm^tno

contest)/ I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an

offense that carries Vnwrrlfnum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself
to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense.

I know that the

sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know
that in addition to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%) surcharge, required by Utah
Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by
the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes.
1 1 . I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am
on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) I am waiving
my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs.

I also

know that by entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have
committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s)
is/are entered.
13. My plea(s) of (gutffy) {po contest) (te) (is not) the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions
of this plea bargain, is any, are gully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this

4

affidavit.
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of (guilty)
(no contest) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my
plea.
15.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession of recommendation of

probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing
made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the judge.

I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they

believe the court may do are also not binding on the court.
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the
attached plea agreement, have been made to me.
17. I have read this statement or I have had i read to me by my attorney, and
I understand its provisions.

I know that I am free to change or delete anything

contained in this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
19. I am

fy^

years of age; I have attended school through t h e ^ A ^ r ^ r a d e

and I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s).
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which

5

'

impair my judgment.
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any
mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this j j ~

day of ^fj

__, 1

&?.

DEFENDANT

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for j^^j^

^AgO/)

, the

defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read
it to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent.
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct
are correctly stated ahd these, along with the other representations and declarations
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

'/ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR #

6

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
Z**ds» /f6j02tfz?s>

» defendant. I have reviewed this statement of

the defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense of
the charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or
coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are
fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as
supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which
the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public
interest.
N

^V- L,Z^>^
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR #

7

ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification
of the defendant and counsel, the court witnesses the signatures and finds the
defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so
ordered that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in
the statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

/£*

day of

<^f

, 19 f"7-

DISTRlCFCOlIRT JtJbGE

V,

8

ADDENDUM D

SEPTEMBER 15, 1997

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

STATE VERSUS LINDA ANNETTE

KALMAR. CASE NO. 971900756 FS.
MR. BROWN:

APPEARANCES, PLEASE.

LYNN BROWN APPEARING ON BEHALF

OF MS. KALMAR.
THE COURT:

THANK YOU, MR. BROWN.

AND FOR

THE STATE?
MR. JONES:

EARNEST JONES FOR THE STATE.

THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

MR. BROWN:

YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE RESOLVED

MR. JONES.

THIS MATTER WITH A PLEA TO A CLASS A. MISDEMEANOR.
NO CONTEST.

AND WE HAVE A PLEA IN ABEYANCE FORM OR

AGREEMENT THAT WE NEED TO GO OVER WITH THE COURT.
COULD WE DO THAT?
THE COURT:

I DON'T CARE MUCH FOR PLEAS IN

ABEYANCE. WE HAVE JUST DONE IT LAST WEEK, AND I AM
SURE IT'S A STATUTORY CONCEPT THAT HAS TO BE ALLOWED
TO PARTIES, SO WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH IT.
BUT THE STATUS OF THE FILE DURING THE
PERIOD OF THE ABEYANCE, I DON'T WANT IT TO BE AN
OPEN CASE.

I WANT BE TO A CLOSED FILE, BECAUSE IT'S

RESOLVED BY THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE, SO IT DOESN'T

1

STAND AS A CASE PENDING FOR A YEAR ON THE CASE

2

PENDING FILE.

3

Q-

(BY MR. BROWN)

WELL, I ANTICIPATED IT TO

4

BE-- WHAT WE WOULD WANT IS, THE ONLY ISSUE HERE IS A

5

QUESTION OF WHO OWES WHO MONEYS.

6

RESTITUTION.

7

PROVIDED THAT IF SHE SHE OWES NO RESTITUTION, OR IF

8

THEY OWE HER MONEY, THEN THE CASE IS TO BE

9

DISMISSED.

10

A QUESTION OF

AFTER THE RESTITUTION HEARING, WE HAVE

I THINK IT WILL BE --

THE COURT:

SO WE NEED TO SET A RESTITUTION

12

MR. BROWN:

THAT'S CORRECT?

13

THE COURT:

OKAY.

11

14
15

HEARING?

ALL RIGHT.

ARE YOU

COMFORTABLE WITH THE AGREEMENT, THEN?
MR. JONES:

YES, I AM.

AND WE HAVE GONE

16

OVER THE AGREEMENT, JUDGE.

17

IT'S IN WRITING.

18

TO THE COURT WHY WE'RE USING A PLEA IN ABEYANCE IN

19

THIS CASE.

20

IT'S SATISFACTORY.

LET ME, IF I COULD, JUST EXPLAIN

THIS CASE OCCURRED IN AUGUST OF 1994.

AND

21

IT WAS NOT EVEN BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTION FOR ALMOST

22

A YEAR, SO WE STARTED DOING PROSECUTION OR THE

23

INVESTIGATION IN '95.

24

EVEN PICKED UP ON IT UNTIL MAY OF 1997, SO THE CASE

25

IS RATHER OLD.

FOR SOME REASON SHE WAS NOT

MOST OF THE

1

WITNESSES WE HAVE ON THE

CASE

2

WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM OUT OF STATE, WHICH

3

CERTAINLY

4

RESTITUTION

5

STANDPOINT, IS AROUND

$1,500.

6

COMPARING THE COST OF

PROSECUTION AND THE AMOUNT OF

7

RESTITUTION,

8

MATTER.

INCURS A REAL EXPENSE FOR US
IN THIS CASE, AT LEAST FROM

OUR

SO WHEN YOU

START

IT'S PROBABLY A FAIR RESOLUTION

THE OTHER THING,

9

THE

OF THE

IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING

10

DOES NOT HAVE A PRIOR

11

WORKING FOR A BOOK COMPANY, AND FROM OUR STANDPOINT,

12

SHE TOOK SOME CHECKS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO

13

THE COMPANY, AND INSTEAD KEPT THOSE AND CASHED

14

THOSE.

15

JUDGEMENT ON HER PART.

16

CRIMINAL RECORD.

SHE

SHE WAS

SO I THINK IT'S REALLY CASE OF POOR

THE COURT:

WELL, THEN, WHY DO WE WANT

17

TO - - WHY DON'T WE HAVE THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING

18

FIRST AND THEN SEE WHAT WE DO WITH THE CASE?

19

MR. JONES:

WELL, I THINK SHE'S WILLING TO

20

DO THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE SO WE GET THE ISSUES OF

21

GUILT OR INNOCENCE OUT OF THE WAY.

22

BRING IN THE EVIDENCE ON THE RESTITUTION TO

23

DETERMINE HOW MUCH IF ANY IS OWING.

AND WE'LL JUST

24

THE COURT:

BUT THE PLEA IS NO CONTEST.

25

MR. JONES:

NO CONTEST.

THAT'S RIGHT.

1

THE COURT:

WHICH DOESN'T -- I MEAN, I WILL

2

ACCEPT IT AS THOUGH IT WERE A GUILTY PLEA, BUT IT'S

3

REALLY NOT A ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

4

THE FEEL FOR THIS CASE, FOR WHATEVER THAT'S WORTH,

5

MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE STATE IS NOT INTERESTED IN

6

PROSECUTING HER.

7

AND YOU FOUND OUT THAT, INDEED, THEY OWED HER MONEY,

8

YOU WOULDN'T WANT TO PROSECUTE HER.

9

SHE'S NOT - - AS I GET

IF YOU WENT THROUGH THE EVIDENCE

MR. JONES:

RIGHT. THAT'S WHY WE'RE

10

WILLING - - I F THE COURT DETERMINES THERE IS NO

11

RESTITUTION OWING, I THINK WE ARE GOING TO

12

ESSENTIALLY DISMISS THE CASE.

13

THAT'S THE WAY IT'S GOING TO COME DOWN, BUT --

14

SO I DON'T THINK

THE COURT:

AND OF COURSE WE DON'T KNOW

16

MR. JONES:

RIGHT.

17

THE COURT:

DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO

15

18

THAT.

HAVING THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING FIRST?

19

MR. JONES:

I JUST -- TO US, THE ONLY ISSUE

20

IS RESTITUTION.

21

THOUGHT BY DOING A PLEA IN ABEYANCE, WE COULD

22

RESOLVE THAT AND JUST GET TO THE RESTITUTION

23

QUESTION.

24
25

HOW MUCH, IF ANY, IS OWING.

THE COURT:

AND WE

AND I SUPPOSE THAT THERE ARE

PROBLEMS WITH THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OR OTHER PROBLEMS

ift

1

IN TERMS OF A RESTITUTION HEARING IF YOU

2

DEALT WITH THE

PLEA.

3

MR. JONES:

RIGHT.

4

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

5

HAVEN'T

THAT COULD B E , YES.
SO YOU'RE

COMFORTABLE WITH THIS AGREEMENT.

6

MR. BROWN:

THAT'S WHAT WE AGREED TO, YES

7

THE COURT :

OKAY.

FINE.

ALL RIGHT.

8

MS. KALMAR, DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT'AS BEING

9

SREQUESTED HERE OF THE COURT?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT :

YES.

YOU'RE ASKING, THROUGH YOUR

12

COUNSEL, THAT I AUTHORIZE YOU TO ENTER WHAT'S CALLED

13

A PLEA IN ABEYANCE , WHICH MEANS THAT YOU WILL ENTER

14

A PLEA TITLED "NO CONTEST", BUT IT WOULD BE

15

INTERPRETED BY ME ,AS AN ADMISSION OF OF GUILT IN THE

16

EVENT I LATER HAD TO REVIEW THIS FOR SOME REASON.
IN OTHER iWORDS, I COULD TREAT IT AS THOUGH

17
18

IT WERE A GUILTY PLEA WHEN IT'S A NO CONTEST PLEA.

19

I KNOW THAT SOUNDS A BIT CONFUSING.
MR. BROWN :

20

I EXPLAINED TO HER THAT IT HAS

21

THE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS A GUILTY PLEA.

22

DO THE SAME THING 'THAT YOU COULD ON THIS AS A GUILTY

23

PLEA.

24

CULPABILITY OR WRONG-DOING.

25

YOU CAN

THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS, SHE DOESN'T ADMIT ANY

THE COURT :

RIGHT.

SO WHAT SHE'S CLAIMING

8
1

IS THAT WHATEVER ERRORS WERE MADE WERE BOOKKEEPING

2

PROBLEMS OR SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE.
MR. BROWN:

3

YEAH.

WE'LL GET INTO THAT IN

THE RESTITUTION HEARING.

4

THE COURT:

5

OKAY.

ALL RIGHT.

IF I ACCEPT

6

YOUR PLEA TO NO CONTEST ON THIS CASE, YOU'RE

7

ALL OF YOUR RIGHTS TO TRIAL.

8

THIS POINT ON, THERE WOULD BE NO TRIAL.

9

WOULD NOT BE OBLIGATED TO CALL WITNESSES TO TESTIFY

WAIVING

THAT MEANS THAT FROM
THE STATE

10

AGAINST YOU, YOU WOULD WAIVE YOUR RIGHTS OF SILENCE,

11

AND ACKNOWLEDGE AT LEAST WHAT HAPPENED HERE, SO THAT

12

WE COULD GET TO THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

13

UNDERSTAND THAT?
THE DEFENDANT:

14

DO YOU

I UNDERSTAND THAT, WITH THE

PROVISO THAT WE'LL HAVE THE RESTITUTION HEARING.

15
16

THE COURT:

YES.

17

MR. JONES:

AND THAT I CAN OFFER EVIDENCE

AT THAT TIME

18

THE COURT:

19

THAT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD.

20

HAVE YOU BEEN SATISFIED WITH THE ADVICE OF YOUR

21

ATTORNEY, MR. BROWN?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

1

OKAY.

YES.

ARE YOU AT THIS TIME UNDER THE

INFLUENCE OF ANY DRUG, ALCOHOL, NARCOTIC, OR
ANYTHING THAT WOULD IMPAIR YOUR JUDGMENT?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

COUPLE OF ASPIRIN.

COUPLE OF ASPIRIN.

DO THEY

IMPAIR YOUR JUDGMENT?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I DON'T THINK SO.

ALL RIGHT.

AND DO YOU FEEL

CAPABLE OF PROCEEDING?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

YES.

ALL RIGHT.

THEN TO THE AMENDED

INFORMATION, THEFT, A CLASS A. MISDEMEANOR -- ARE WE
AMENDING THE AMOUNT, MR. JONES?
MR. JONES:

YES.

MR. BROWN:

I HAVE MADE IT AN INTENT.

THE COURT:

OKAY?

MR. JONES:

OKAY.

THE COURT:

INCHOATE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED

THEFT, AND THEN THE AMOUNT STAYS?
MR. BROWN:

YES.

THE COURT:

OKAY.

AND THE PENALTY FOR A

CLASS A. MISDEMEANOR MAY BE ONE YEAR IN THE COUNTY
JAIL AND A FINE OF OF $2,500.

DO YOU UNDERSTAND

THAT?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

YES, UH-HUH.

TO THIS OFFENSE, DO YOU PLEAD

GUILTY, NOT GUILTY, OR NO CONTEST?
THE DEFENDANT:

NO CONTEST.

Ko

1XL
1

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

HOW LONG WILL THE

2

RESTITUTION HEARING TAKE, AND ARE YOU READY TO

3

PROCEED WITH IT?

4

MR. JONES:

PROBABLY A COUPLE OF HOURS.

5

MR. BROWN:

IT COULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME.

I

6

I HAVE TO GET SOME OF THE RECORDS FROM THIS COMPANY,

7

WHICH IS OUT OF STATE, SO --

8

THE COURT:

YOU WANT SOME TIME TO SET IT.

9

MR. BROWN:

I WILL WANT SOME TIME.

10

TIME.

11

COULD, TO DEAL WITH THAT.

12

TO DIG UP SOME RECORDS AND OLD CHECKS FOR

13

COMMISSIONS THAT THEY HAVE PAID TO .HER.

14

GOT TO DIG UP ALL THE FINANCIAL RECORDS.

15

COULD GO BACK A WHILE.

16
17

SOME

PROBABLY ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER.

THE COURT:

IF I

BECAUSE I'M GOING TO HAVE

SO I HAVE
SO THAT

DO YOU HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY WITH

THOSE DATES, MR. JONES?

18

MR. JONES:

NO.

THAT'S FINE, YOUR HONOR.

19

THE COURT:

WHY DON'T WE SET IT FOR AN HOUR

20

AND A HALF HEARING FOR NOVEMBER 6, AT 8:30.

21

ANY DIFFICULTY WITH WITH THAT, COUNSEL?

OKAY.

22

MR. BROWN:

IS THAT A FRIDAY?

23

THE COURT:

IT'S A THURSDAY MORNING AT

24

8:30, AND I'M SETTING THIS SO THAT IT'S 8:30 TO TEN,

25

BECAUSE TEN O'CLOCK WOULD BE MY TIME THAT I WOULD BE

C"^

3JL
ANTICIPATING BEGINNING A TRIAL.
MR. BROWN:

THAT SHOULD BE OKAY, YOUR

THE COURT:

I WILL APPRECIATE IT IF THIS

HONOR.

MATTER, WHEN YOU GET ALL THE THE DATA AND THE
RECORDS, IF YOU HAVE AN ABILITY TO STIPULATE, LET ME
KNOW WELL IN ADVANCE OF THAT, SO THAT I CAN HAVE
THAT TIME BACK.

I DO HAVE A TRIAL SET THE DAY

BEFORE, AND IF I COULD START THAT TRIAL EARLIER I
WOULD.
SO THERE IS GOING TO BE NO COMMUNICATION
BETWEEN US BETWEEN NOW AND THE DATE OF THE
RESTITUTION HEARING.
THAT.

NO PRETRIAL OR ANYTHING LIKE

SO LET ME KNOW IN ADVANCE IF YOU CAN REACH AN

AGREEMENT.
MR. BROWN:

SHALL WE EXECUTE THIS?

THE COURT:

YES.

STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT.

IF YOU WILL SIGN THE
AND MR. BROWN, YOU

STATED THAT YOU WANTED TO SAY SOMETHING MORE ABOUT
THE FACTS AND ELEMENTS?
MR. BROWN:

YES.

IF YOU'D LIKE ME TO.

THE COURT:

I THOUGHT YOU SAID YOU WERE

MR. BROWN:

THE ISSUE IS, SHE PUT IN HER

GOING TO.

RESIGNATION FOR THE EMPLOYMENT, AND AT THE TIME SHE

^

l^-

1

PUT IN HER RESIGNATION SHE STILL HAD SOME MONEY

2

COMING ON COMMISSIONS.

3

SHE GOT A PERCENTAGE OF ALL THE BOOK SALES.

4

MADE SIXTEEN PERCENT.

5

LETTER OF RESIGNATION WAS IN AUGUST OF '94, AND SO

6

TERMINATED HER EMPLOYMENT AT THAT TIME.

7

SHE DIDN'T RECEIVE A SALARY;
SHE

AND THE RESIGNATION -- THE

AND AFTER SHE TERMINATED HER EMPLOYMENT.

8

CHECKS CAME TO HER DIRECTLY FROM THE PEOPLE THAT SHE

9

SOLD THE BOOKS TO.

10

SO SHE ENDORSED THE CHECKS AND

DEPOSITED THEM IN HER BANK ACCOUNT.

11

ACTUALLY, I THINK HER SISTER DID ON TWO OF

12

THEM.

13

AND THAT WAS THE ISSUE.

14
15

BUT SHE FELT THAT SHE HAD THE MONEY COMING,

THE COURT:

I GUESS THAT WOULD BE BE OFFSET

AGAINST THE 16 PERCENT OR 18 PERCENT.

16

MR. BROWN:

YES.

17

THE COURT:

OKAY.

ALL RIGHT.

THE RECORD

18

MAY SHOW IN OPEN COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS SIGNED

19

THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT AND THE COURT WILL

20

ADD ITS SIGNATURE AS A WITNESS TO HERS.

21

NOTE I HAVE GONE THROUGH AN ABBREVIATED COLLOQUY IN

22

THIS CASE.

23

YOU WILL

JUST SO THAT EACH OF YOU UNDERSTAND, FOR

24

THE COMPUTER'S PURPOSES, THIS CASE WILL BE DISMISSED

25

UNDER A CATEGORY CALLED "OTHER," AND IT SIMPLY WILL

1

BE DISMISSED AS OF THIS TIME.

2

IT'S RESOLVED,

3

PURPOSES

THAT DOESN'T

IT SIMPLY MEANS THAT FOR

MEAN

COMPUTER

IT'S NOT AN ON-GOING, PENDING CASE.

4

MR. BROWN:

THANK YOU.

5

THE COURT:

OKAY.

6

(PROCEEDINGS

CONCLUDED.)

7
8
9
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ADDENDUM E

_Li

NOVEMBER

6, 1997

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

P R O C E E D I N G S .
(COMMENCING AT 8:30
THE COURT:

A.M.)

GOOD MORNING.

THIS IS THE TIME

SET FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER THE STATE OF
UTAH VERSUS LINDA ANETTE KALMAR, 971900756.
ISS TIME SET FOR A RESTITUTION HEARING.

THIS

COUNSEL,

FIRST, WILL YOU EACH STATE YOUR A P P E A R A N C E S .
MR. BROWN:

LYNN BROWN APPEARING ON BEHALF

OF M S . KALMAR.
MR. J O N E S :

ERNEST JONES ON BEHALF OF THE

THE COURT:

WHAT'S ANTICIPATED

MR. BROWN:

I GUESS WHEN WE TALKED ABOUT

STATE.
TODAY?
IT

A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO, I GUESS WE DECIDED TO SET IT
FOR A TRIAL.
THE COURT:
THE DISCUSSION,

LET'S MAKE A RECORD OF

SO THAT WE HAVE FORMAL RECORD.

RECORD SHOULD SHOW
RECOLLECTION,

OKAY.

-- AND IF YOU HAVE A DIFFERENT

PLEASE HELP ME OR EXPAND UPON THE

RECOLLECTION OF YOUR OWN INFORMATION
REQUEST,

THE

-- THAT AT THE

I THINK, OF MR. BROWN, BOTH THE

PROSECUTOR

AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY MET WITH THE COURT A FEW DAYS
AGO AND DISCUSSED AN ISSUE REGARDING THE

DIFFICULTY

.

1 a

OF DETERMINING THE RESTITUTION.

1

THE ISSUE WAS THAT APPARENTLY AT THE TIME

2
3

THAT THE DEFENDANT ENTERED A NO CONTEST PLEA, WHICH

4

WAS ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER,

5

THE DEFENDANT, IT WAS ALLEGED BY THE COMPANY -- I

6

THINK IT WAS A COMPANY CALLED COOK PUBLISHING.

'97, THAT AT THAT TIME

7

MR. BROWN:

COOKS BOOKS.

8

THE COURT:

COOKS BOOKS.

ANYWAY, A

PUBLISHING COMPANY FOR WHICH SHE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY

9
10

EMPLOYED, HAD INDICATED AND ALLEGED TO THE

11

PROSECUTION THAT SHE HAD TAKEN IMPROPERLY SOME

12

CHECKS AND DEPOSITED THEM TO HER ACCOUNT, AND IT WAS

13

ABOUT $1,50 0.

14

THERE WAS THEN A DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT SHE

15

OWED THEM MONEY AND THEY OWED HER MONEY, THAT THERE

16

WAS REALLY A NEED FOR AN ACCOUNTING.

17

•

THE ISSUE OF THE RESTITUTION.
THE COMPANY THEN SENT SOME OTHER RECENT

18
19

AND THAT WAS

,

CORRESPONDENCE THAT YOU HAD AND REFERRED TO AT THE

20

TIME WE WERE MEETING IN MY CHAMBERS, AND INDICATED

21

THAT IN FACT THE NET OBLIGATION AFTER THEY OFFSET

22

THE COMMISSIONS THEY OWED HER AND THE MONEY THAT SHE

23

OWED THEM, AND SO ON, WAS SOMETHING LIKE $687

24

DOLLARS, IF I RECALL FROM THE DISCUSSION.

25

MR. BROWN:

THAT'S PRETTY CLOSE, YES.

1 9
1

THE COURT:

2

DISCUSSION FURTHER,

3

HAD SOME SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ALLOWING

4

PLEA TO STAND

5

MATTER BETWEEN PARTIES AND NOT AND A CIVIL

MATTER

6

THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THE CIVIL COURT

BECAUSE

7

YOU FEEL THAT THERE IN FACT WAS A CLASS A.

8

MISDEMEANOR

9

IN ANY EVENT, TO CONTINUE

THE

I EXPRESSED TO THE STATE THAT I
THE

IF THIS WAS SIMPLY AN ACCOUNTING

TO WHICH SHE PLED.

IN FACT, I THOUGHT IT WAS A THIRD

DEGREE

10

FELONY, BUT I SEE NOW IN MY INFORMATION SHE PLED TO

11

AN ATTEMPTED THEFT.

12

SO, I WOULD NOT BE INCLINED, AS I RECALL

13

DISCUSSION, TO PUT SOMEBODY IN THE STATE PRISON FOR

14

ZERO TO FIVE ON SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE.

15

DISCUSSION.

WHICH IS A CLASS A.

THAT EVEN
OUR

THAT WAS OUR

16

AT THAT POINT I THINK, MR. BROWN,

17

INDICATED THAT PERHAPS YOUR CLIENT WOULD WANT TO TO

18

WITHDRAW THE PLEA, AND WE WOULD THEN SET IT FOR

19

TRIAL.

20
21

NOW,
OF OUR

IS THAT A AN ACCURATE

YOU

REPRESENTATION

DISCUSSION?

22

MR. BROWN:

I THINK THAT'S FAIRLY ACCURATE.

23

THE COURT:

MR. JONES?

24

MR. J O N E S :

I THINK THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR

25

HONOR.

2_Q_

1
2

THE COURT:

IS THERE ANYTHING THAT

EITHER

OF YOU WISH TO ADD TO THE RECORD?

3

MR. BROWN:

NO.

4

MR. J O N E S :

THERE IS.

AND THAT IS, I JUST

5

DON'T THINK AT THIS POINT IN TIME AT THAT

6

DEFENDANT CAN WITHDRAW THE PLEA.

7

ALREADY POINTED OUT, SHE ENTERED A NO CONTEST

8

ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER.

9

BEYOND THAT POINT NOW ON THE 6TH OF N O V E M B E R .

AS YOU

THE
HAVE

WE'RE A L M O S T TWO

PLEA

MONTHS
IF I

10

READ THE STATUTE CORRECTLY, 77-13-6, SHE HAS TO MAKE

11

A REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THAT PLEA, AND

12

HAS TO DONE WITHIN

13

I BELIEVE

3 0 DAYS FOR GOOD CAUSE

SHOWN.

THERE IS A CASE CALLED STATE VERSUS

14

837 PACIFIC 2D, 578.

15

SHE CANNOT WITHDRAW THE PLEA.

16

THE COURT TO DENY THE REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THE

17

AT THIS

THE

I THINK ONCE THE 30 DAYS IS UP
SO I WOULD

SIMPLY

ASK

PLEA

THE C O U R T :

IS IT YOUR REQUEST TO

MR. BROWN:

WELL, I'M A LITTLE

WITHDRAW

PLEA?

20
21

BECAUSE

22

MR. JONES SAID,

23

PRICE,

POINT.

18
19

IT

SURPRISED.

I THINK LAST TIME WHEN WE WERE DISCUSSING

IT

"WELL, LET'S JUST SET IT FOR TRIAL."

SO I DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS GOING TO BE ANY

24

PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO THAT.

25

THE COURT:

I SEE.

2JL
1

MR. BROWN:

BUT AS I INDICATED TO THE

2

COURT, THE INFORMATION THAT WE RECEIVED MAKES IT

3

VERY CLEAR TO ME THAT THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL INTENT

4

INVOLVED HERE.

5

HAVE BEEN LITIGATED IN THE CIVIL COURTS.

6

AND IT'S SIMPLY A MATTER THAT SHOULD

IF THE COURT'S NOT INCLINED TO TAKE THE

7

WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA, I GUESS WE'LL HAVE TO DEAL

8

WITH THAT.

9

THE COURT:

I CERTAINLY HAVEN'T READ THIS

10

RECENT CASE.

I DO KNOW WHEN WE ADVISE PEOPLE THAT

11

GO THROUGH THE COLLOQUY OF A PLEA THAT WE DO

12

INDICATE THAT THEY CAN WITHDRAW THEIR PLEA ANY TIME

13

WITHIN 30 DAYS.

14

I WILL TELL YOU THAT IF YOU FILE A MOTION

15

TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA, I BELIEVE THERE'S GOOD CAUSE

16

FOR ALLOWING THE PLEA TO BE WITHDRAWN.

17
18
19

MR. BROWN:

I DIDN'T KNOW THERE WAS GOING

TO BE ANY ISSUE ABOUT THAT.
THE COURT:

THEN THE COURT WILL AUTHORIZE

20

THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA, AND DENY THE OBJECTION

21

OF THE STATE.

22

STRICKEN IN THIS CASE.

23

BACK, FOR TECHNICAL REASONS, BACK TO THE THEFT, A

24

THIRD DEGREE FELONY WHICH WAS THE ORIGINAL CHARGE IN

25

THE INFORMATION.

SO THAT PLEA IS WITHDRAWN AND
NOW, I ASSUME THAT TAKES US

22
MR. J O N E S :

TO ALLOW HER TO WITHDRAW THE

ARE GOING
SUGGEST

IN LIGHT OF YOUR

THAT RATHER THAN SET IT FOR

RULING, IF YOU
PLEA, I WOULD

TRIAL., IF YOU

WOULD SET IT OVER FOR 3 0 DAYS TO GIVE ME AN
OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT WE, WANT TO
APPEAL THE

COURT'S RULING.

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

MR. J O N E S :

I DO THINK THE STATUTE

THE STATE TO APPEAL THAT PARTICULAR
I THINK RATHER

ALLOWS

PROVISION

BUT

THAN SETTING IT FOR TRIAL, I WOULD

LIKE SOME TIME TO THE LOOK AT THAT.

OBJECTION

THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. BROWN:

NO.

THE COURT:

OKAY.

TO THAT EITHER.

ANY

OBJECTION• TO THAT?

I DON'T

HAVE ANY

LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY : I

HAVE

A L R E A D Y INDICATED TO YOU WHAT I AM INCLINED

DO.

I DID THAT

IN MY CHAMBERS EARLIER, AND I ' M A

LITTLE CONCERNED
LAW A D E Q U A T E L Y

AS TO WHETHER WE

CASE AS

FLESHED OUT THE

FOR THE ISSUES ON A P P E A L .

YOU BRING UP YOUR ARGUMENT AT THAT
TO THIS

TO

MR. JONES,

POINT REFERRING

837 PAC. 2D 578, I THINK YOU SAID.

MR. J O N E S :

YES .

THE COURT:

WHICH OF COURSE I HAVEN' T READ

MR. J O N E S :

IF YOU WANT TO TAKE IT UNDER

RECENTLY,

23

ADVISEMENT -THE COURT:

I REALLY DON'T.

I'M GOING TO

RULE THIS WAY, BUT I AM JUST WONDERING IF YOU WANT
TO FLESH IT OUT BY ANY OTHER PLEADINGS.
IF YOU WANT, MR. BROWN, TO FILE A MOTION TO
WITHDRAW THE PLEA, OR IF YOU'RE SATISFIED WITH THE
RECORD, I'M SATISFIED WITH THE DISCUSSION THAT I HAD
THAT I'M NOT COMFORTABLE ACCEPTING A PLEA.

IT WAS A

NO CONTEST PLEA; IT WAS NOT AN ADMISSION OF GUILT,
AND I'M JUST NOT GOING TO BE HAPPY WITH A PLEA UNDER
THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.
I FIRST THOUGHT THAT SHE HAD -- BASICALLY
THE CHARGE MAY HAVE BEEN -- EVEN BEEN A LITTLE
INNACURATE IN THE SENSE THAT IT WAS CHARGED AS A
THEFT, WHEN IN FACT IT PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CHARGED AS EMBEZZLING, I SUPPOSE.

SHE HAD THE

LAWFUL RIGHT TO HAVE THE CHECKS WHICH SHE DEPOSITED
INTO HER ACCOUNT.
AND THEN THERE WAS THIS OFF-SETTING
SITUATION.

SO I DON'T KNOW.

UNCOMFORTABLE CASE FOR ME.

THE CASE IS JUST AN
I'M NOT WILLING TO SEND

SOMEBODY TO PRISON AND ALLOW THE POTENTIAL THAT THEY
WILL GO TO PRISON ON THE BASIS OF THE RECORD I KNOW
HAVE .
THAT MEANS THAT BOTH OF YOU MAY DISCOVER

ZA_
AND GIVE ME OTHER INFORMATION HEREAFTER.
PLEA IS WITHDRAWN.

SO THE

I'LL GIVE YOU 3 0 DAYS TO

CONSIDER WHETHER TO APPEAL THE MATTER.

THAT WOULD

MEAN THAT TODAY IS THE 6TH ARE NOVEMBER, SO HOW
ABOUT YOU FILE YOUR NOTICE OF READINESS ON OR BEFORE
DECEMBER 5TH, WHICH IS A FRIDAY.

OR NOTICE OF

APPEAL, WHICH IS A FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, WHICH IS A
FRIDAY.
SHALL WE NOW SET THE CASE FOR REVIEW ON
DECEMBER 8 SO THAT WE DON'T LET IT GET LOST IN THE
FILING SYSTEM?
IS THAT ON YOUR REGULAR

MR. BROWN:
CALENDAR •?
THE COURT:
MORNING.

A SIMPLE REVIEW ON MONDAY

DECEMBER 8.

AND IF THE CASE IS GOING TO

GO FURTHER, BE RETURNED BACK FOR FOR TRIAL, WE'LL
SET THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL AT THAT TIME, OR WE'LL
RESOLVE IT, HOWEVER YOU DETERMINE.
MR. JONES:
CITED WAS 77-13-6.
THE COURT:

THE SECTION OF THE CODE THAT I
TALKS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA.
OKAY.

ALL RIGHT.

WELL, I WILL

CONSIDER THIS CASE NEXT ON DECEMBER 8 FOR REVIEW.

RECESS.

MR. BROWN:

THANKS, JUDGE.

THE COURT:

THANK YOU EACH.

THE COURT'S IN

WILL YOU PREPARE AN ORDER, MR. BROWN,

,

2_5_
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1
2

|

WITHDRAWING THE PLEA, DOING WHAT I HAVE JUST

SAID

TODAY.

3

MR. BROWN:

YES.

4

THE COURT:

OKAY.

5

(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AND COURT IN RECESS

6

AT 8:50

A.M.)

7
8
9
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ADDENDUM F

SENATE BILL 81
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA AMENDMENTS
SENATE DEBATE
JANUARY 24, 1989

Sen. Carling:

Mr. President. At the present time, there is
no limitation on when a person can withdraw a
guilty plea. The courts and prosecutors have
indicated this has happened sometimes even
after four and five years after a person has
entered a guilty plea when there's no way to
come back and retry their case after the
evidence is gone. In order to be fair to
both the defendant and to the state, this
bill has been presented which would indicate
that a person may withdraw their guilty plea
only within 3 0 days after they entered that
plea and there has been a final disposition
or, and also requires at the time that the
person makes their plea that the court be
advised that he has 3 0 days to withdraw that
guilty plea or that right would be withdrawn.
There was no opposition from either side in
the committee hearings in this matter. We do
need to have one amendment, if there's no
questions, to add to the bill. Mr. Chairman,
I see no question. I would, we passed out an
amendment on the buff copy. This is a law
which also amends the Utah Rules of
Procedure, and in amending Rules of
Procedure, it takes a two-thirds vote of the
body. This language incorporates the fact
that we are amending the Rules of Procedure
as well as the law. I would move the
adoption of the amendments that have been
passed out in regards to Rules of Procedure.

HOUSE DEBATE
Mr. Speaker:

Senate Bill 81.

Reading Clerk:

Senate Bill 81, Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
Amendments by Senator Richard J. Carling. Be
it enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Utah.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative Cuttle.

Rep. Cuttle:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. This bill comes to
us from the state-wide association of
prosecutors and the issue here is a 3 0-day
retraction of a guilty plea. Sometimes
people are sentenced to jail and they plead
guilty, then they go to jail, and then they
wait a long time and they send a lot of
motions and then they come back and withdraw
the plea. And so this puts a 3 0-day time
limit on it. Most of these complaints are
from the prison down at the point of the
mountain. Sometimes they've gone as long as
four to five years before they withdrew the
guilty plea, and then that has been sent to
the court of appeals and they've overruled
it. So this is just streamline it and get it
back where everything's fair and a speedy
trial.

Mr. Speaker:

Is there discussion to Senate Bill 81? I see
no lights, Representative. I'll return to
you for sum-up.

Rep. Cuttle:

Waive sum-up.

Mr. Speaker:

Summation's waived.
Bill 81.

5

Madam Reading Clerk.

Voting's open on Senate

